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Abstract 
We propose a decision-analytical approach 
to comparing the flexibility of decision sit­
uations from the perspective of a decision­
maker who exhibits constant risk-aversion 
over a monetary value modeL Our approach 
is simple yet seems to be consistent with a va­
riety of flexibility concepts, including robust 
and adaptive alternatives. We try to com­
pensate within the model for uncertainty that 
wi'IS not anticipated or not modeled. This ap­
proach not only allows one to compare the 
flexibility of plans, but also guides the search 
for new, more flexible alternatives. 
Keywords: flexibility, risk-aversion, �odel u�cer­
tainty, decision analysis, decision-theoretic planmng. 
1 INT RODUCTION 
In any systematic approach to decision-making, 
whether it be decision analysis, AI planning, or corpo­
rate strategy, a desirable feature in any plan is "flex­
ibility." Unfortunately, as tempting as the concept of 
flexibility is, it has been hard to define. In this pa­
per we propose a simple, decision-analytic approach 
to comparing the flexibility of two plans. This ap­
proach is consistent with the variety of concepts in the 
literature. 
An early classic work on flexibility is Stigler(1939). 
This paper compares two potential configurations for 
the operation of a factory, with two corresponding cost 
curves, as shown in Figure 1. One curve, C1, can 
acheive a lower cost, but it is quite sensitive to the un­
certain quantity. The other curve, C2, is less sensitive 
to the uncertainty, but might cost more than Cl. This 
is an example of what we call robust flexibility, since 
our concern is developing a plan that will function well 
in the face of uncertainty. To analyze Stigler's prob­
lem, it is not enough to know the cost curves; we need 
a probability distribution over the uncertain quantity, 
too. 
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Uncertain Quantity 
Figure 1: A production facility can operate at two 
cost curves as a function of an uncertain quantity. Al­
though curve Cl can ac.heive a lower cost, C2 is less 
sensitive to the uncertainty. This is an example of 
robust flexibility. 
Some more sophisticated approaches to flexibility in­
volve the subtle interaction of information and de­
cisions (Chavez and Shachter 1995; Jones and Os­
troy 1984; Mandelbaum 1978; Marschak and Miya­
sawa 1968· Marschak and Nelson 1962). These frame­
works inv�lve two sequential decisions, a commitment 
and a reaction, with an intervening obseration, as rep­
resented by the influence diagram shown in Figure 2. 
Usually some commitments offer more or better reac­
tion alternatives, but at a cost. This is what we call 
adaptive flexibility, since the flexibility comes from the 
opportunity to react in light of the observation. 
Another school of thought is that decision analysis 
automatically and implicitly incorporates flexibility 
(Merkofer 1977). This assumes that we have mod­
eled all of the choices and information available. This 
approach would subsume both robust and adaptive 
flexibility, but seems to miss something critical that 
motivates modelers to consider issues of flexibility in 
the first place. That is, the decision analytic approach 
assumes that our model is complete. 
In this paper, we follow the decision analysis tradition, 
but recognize that there is some uncertainty that we 
were unable to model, perhaps because we could not 
anticipate it. Reasoning by analogy from the uncer-
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Figure 2: An adaptive plan is represented in this influ­
ence diagram. After a commitment decision is made, 
an observation is revealed, and then a reaction decision 
is made. The observation can depend on the commit­
ment, and the value of the situation can depend on the 
decisions and the observation. 
tainty we are able to model, we guess how much un­
certainty is "missing" from our model, and we "add" 
it directly to our value model. This allows us to com­
pare different plans or decision situations, regardless 
whether they fit the templates for robust or adaptive 
flexibility. Although the resulting measure is approxi­
mate, it suggests new alternatives we can introduce to 
increase flexibility. 
To illustrate these concepts, consider the management 
of an investment portfolio. An inflexible investment 
might be one in which the capital is locked in place 
for a long term. A robust investment might be in an 
instrument that performs well in a variety of market 
conditions. On the other hand, an adaptive investment 
might be one that can be shifted easily in response 
to changing markets. Decision analysis provides the 
machinery for us to explicitly balance the value of this 
flexibility against any premium in cost. Finally, we 
might chose to magnify the uncertainty in our decision 
analysis model, if we believe that there are important 
uncertainties we have failed to model. 
In Section 2 we will explore this concept in more detail. 
Section 3 develops notation and technical results. We 
combine those in Section 4 to obtain our definition of 
flexibility orders and investigate its implications. Fi­
nally, we discuss our conclusions and some directions 
for further research. 
2 CONCEPTS 
In this section we describe the concepts behind our 
approach to flexibility. Coupled with the technical re­
sults in the next section, this leads to the flexibility 
orders in Section 4. 
We can identify several criteria that we would like our 
approach to satisfy. First, we would like it to operate 
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Figure 3: The valuation of a decision situation is il­
lustrated by a flow chart. Models of the situation are 
shown by the rounded rectangles, necessarily limited 
in accuracy. The distribution over the value attribute 
can then be computed. W hen the decision-maker sat­
isfies the delta property, it is then easy to compute 
an equivalent certain attribute value for the decision 
situation. 
on a large variety of general decision models. Ideally, 
it should be applicable to models represented by the 
decision analysis type of decision trees (Raiffa 1968) 
or influence diagrams (Howard and Matheson 1984). 
Second, it should be conceptually simple. Third, it 
should be useful for suggesting or stimulating the gen­
eration of new plans or alternatives. Fourth, it should 
be general enough to incorporate most of the concepts 
currently in the literature. Fifth, it should agree with 
our common sense; for example, adding a new alter­
native to a plan should never decrease its flexibility. 
We believe that there is an underlying theme behind 
the concepts of flexibility in the literature, namely, 
that a plan must be able to perform well under unan­
ticipated or unmodeled uncertainty. Consider the flow 
chart shown in Figure 3. Under any decision situation, 
we can model the performance of a system with vary­
ing degrees of accuracy. The simplest model might be 
deterministic; we can acheive more accuracy by con­
sidering uncertainty. Regardless, there will be con­
siderable uncertainty that remains unmodeled, either 
because it was too complex, or because we could not 
anticipate it. 
One challenge is how to recognize and estimate this 
unmodeled uncertainty. It is difficult to incorporate it 
into the model, but since all we really care about is 
the uncertainty in the value attribute, we don't need 
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Figure 4: Probability distributions over the model at­
tribute X before and after manipulations. 
to add the uncertainty to the model. Instead, we di­
rectly manipulate the value attribute distribution to 
incorporate the uncertainty we believe is missing from 
the model. Finally, if we have additional structure in 
the value model, as assumed in the next section, we 
can simplify the analysis of the value of the decision 
situation. 
There are a couple of ways we can introduce un­
certainty into the value attribute distribution. Con­
sider the probability distributions over value attributes 
shown in Figure 4. The modeled distribution in shown 
in Figure 4a. A natural way to introduce uncertainty 
into the value distribution is to add independent uncer­
tainty to obtain the distribution shown in Figure 4b. 
Note that the probability masses become densities, 
and the the density becomes more diffuse. Another 
transformation is to rescale the attribute axis to ob­
tain the distribution shown in Figure 4c. In this case, 
probability masses stay masses but densities become 
more diffuse. 
This approach is based on several key assumptions. 
First, we can make up for the unmodeled uncertainty 
by adding some to the model. Second, we can use 
the uncertainty in the model as a guide for where to 
add the additonal uncertainty. Third, the model is 
robust enough to provide sensible outputs when it is 
distorted beyond its designed range. These assump­
tions are hard to justify, but reasonable if we are to 
exercise the model to handle the unforeseen. Keep­
ing them in mind, we can recognize that perhaps the 
most valuable use of the flexibility measure might be 
in inspiring the generation of new alternatives, that is, 
suggesting superior plans. 
3 NOTATION AND ANALYTICAL 
RESULTS 
In this section, we introduce fundamental concepts of 
decision-making and the characterization of the value 
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of an uncertain decision situation. We derive a new, 
simple, and useful result that will allow us to recog­
nize flexibility orders for particular types of decision­
makers. 
The decision-maker takes actions that affect her world 
in uncertain ways, and she chooses actions by compar­
ing their anticipated effects. Bayesian decision analysis 
provides a coherent rational framework for analyzing 
her choices. This is not a descriptive technique pre­
dicting the behavior of the decision-maker in practice, 
but rather a normative approach consistent with a set 
of conditions that she might reasonably choose to sat­
isfy. 
A decision is an irrevocable allocation of resources, 
usually framed as the selection of an element from a 
set of possible choices called alternatives. To be a de­
cision, the choice has to be available to the decision­
maker, and it has to be a real commitment. If she can 
change her mind at no cost she has not yet made a de­
cision. Conversely, if the choice has not yet been made 
officially, but there is an informal understanding that 
would make it costly to change, then a decision has 
been made already. This corresponds to the flexibility 
with respect to observations in Merkofer(1977) . 
After making her choice, the decision-maker faces an 
uncertain future. She can analyze any possible situa­
tion by considering each possible state and assigning 
it a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility u, such that if 
two situations have uncertain utilities ul and u2, re­
spectively, she would prefer the former if and only if 
E{UI} > E{U2}. 
In this paper, we assume that she can also characterize 
her future in terms of a single variable or attribute of 
the problem. Her beliefs about the uncertain attribute 
X we will call her prospect. The most common single 
attribute is money, although other attributes might 
be more appropriate for particular problems, such as 
the probability of successful mission completion for an 
intelligent agent. Nonetheless, for simplicity the rest of 
the paper assumes that the single attribute is money. 
If the decision-maker is always willing to place a mon­
etary value on any prospect, she is said to have a 
monetary equivalence for prospects. If she has a mone­
tary equivalence, there is some function $( u) called the 
willingness to pay, defined as the most she would pay 
to have a prospect with utility u. Assume that $(u) 
is strictly increasing, so it has a well defined inverse 
function, us($), the utility for money. 
A decision-maker with monetary equivalence is said to 
satisfy the delta property if, for any uncertain mone­
tary prospect X and constant payment c, 
$(E{u$(X +c)})= $(E{u$(X)}) +c. 
In that case, she is willing to pay $(u2)- $(ul) money 
to go from a prospect with utility u1 to a prospect 
with utility u2. The delta property greatly simplifies 
calculations of monetary equivalence, but it also im-
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plies some strong restrictions on $(u) and u$($). The 
following theorem is well known (Pratt 1964) and fun­
damental to our analysis. 
Theorem 1 (Delta Property) Given a monetary 
equivalent decision-maker with a utility function for 
money U$ ( x) that is twice continuously differentiable 
and u$(x) > 0 ,  she satisfies the delta property if and 
only if her absolute risk-aversion is a constant r and 
us(x) = { 1 - ex� -rx) 
1- exp -r 
if r = 0 
if r =f 0 
assuming, without loss of generality, that u$(0) = 0 
and u$(1) = 1. The more general class of utility func­
tions, given by a+bu$(x) where b > 0, reveals the same 
preferences among prospects for all choices of a and b. 
If she satisfies the delta property, the decision-maker's 
attitude toward risk is characterized by her constant 
absolute risk-aversion, r = -u$(x)/u$(x). Her willing­
ness to pay for any uncertain monetary prospect X is 
called her certain equivalence for X, CE(XIr), and it 
is defined as 
CE(XJr) = $(E{u$(X)}). 
In general, it is different from the expected value of 
the prospect, E{ X}, and they are related by the ap­
proximation, 
$(E{u$(X)}) � E{X} + rVa�
{X}
, 
which is exact when X has a Gaussian (or normal) 
distribution. If she is indifferent between any prospect 
and its expectation then r = 0 and she is said to be 
risk-neutral. If she never prefers any uncertain mon­
etary prospect to its expectation then r > 0 and she 
is said to be risk-averse. In general, concave utility 
functions are risk-averse and linear utility functions 
are risk-neutral. Using Theorem 1, we can simplify 
the certain equivalence formula as follows. 
Theorem 2 (Certain Equivalence) Given a mon­
etary equivalent decision-maker satisfying the delta 
property with risk-aversion r > 0 and any uncertain 
monetary prospect X, 
Proof: 
CE(XIr) = $(E{u$(x)}) 
1 1- e�rX 
--ln(l- (1- e�r)E{ } ) r 1- e�r 
- � ln(l - E{1 - e-rX}) r 
-� ln(E{e-rX }) 0 r 
For the comparison of flexibility among decision sit­
uations, we would like to characterize the decision­
maker's willingness to pay for prospects after a linear 
transformation. This can be done simply when the 
decision-maker satisfies the delta property. 
Theorem 3 (Linear Transformation) 
Given a monetary equivalent decision-maker satisfy­
ing the delta property with risk-aversion r, independent 
uncertain monetary prospects X and Z, and positive 
constant k, 
CE(kX + Zlr) = kCE(XIkr) + CE(Zir). 
Proof: 
CE(kX + Zlr) 
-� ln(E{e-r(kX+Z)}) r 
1 
--ln(E{ e-rkX e-rZ}) r 
-
�
 ln(E{e-rkX}E{e-rZ}) 
r 
ln(E{ e-rkX}) ln(E{ e-rkX}) 
r r 
kCE(XJkr) + CE(ZJr) o 
As a result of Theorem 3, we have a simple rule for 
comparing linearly transformed prospects when the 
decision-maker satisfies the delta property. 
Corollary 1 (Transformation Comparison) 
Given a monetary equivalent decision-maker satisfying 
the delta property with risk-aversion r, uncertain mon­
etary prospects X and Y, uncertain monetary prospect 
Z independent of X andY, and positive constant k, 
she prefers prospect kX + Z to kY + Z if and only if 
CE(XJkr) > CE(Yikr). 
4 FLEXIBILITY ORDERS 
We are now ready to state precisely what it means for 
one decision situation to be more flexible than another. 
In this section, we assume that the decision-maker is 
monetary equivalent satisfying the delta property with 
risk-aversion r > 0. In that case, we can apply the re­
sults of the previous section to the concepts introduced 
earlier to obtain a rule for comparing situations. We 
explore the properties of this rule and show that it 
satisfies many of the desiderata we identified earlier. 
Our approach to comparing decision situations is to 
attenuate the uncertainty in the prospects X and Y 
by varying a parameter k. As k increases from 1, the 
uncertainty in the value distribution is magnified. Two 
kinds of uncertainty can be added to the distribution, 
an independent uncertainty and a rescaling of the at­
tribute scale, as shown in Figure 4. Given an uncertain 
monetary prospect Z which is independent of X and Y 
(but might depend on k), we transform X to kX + Z 
to compare flexibilities. The decision-maker consid­
ers X more flexible than Y if she prefers kX + Z to 
kY + Z for all k � 1. If she satisfies the delta property, 
the effects of these changes are easy to analyze, using 
the results in Corollary 1. Adding uncertainty seems 
natural, but doesn't change her relative ordering over 
situations. Rescaling the attribute does change her or­
dering, by effectively rescaling her risk-aversion. These 
results are incorporated into the following definitions. 
Given two uncertain monetary prospects X and Y, 
a monetary equivalent decision-maker satisfying the 
delta property with risk-aversion r > 0 is said to find 
X (strictly) more flexible than Y if there is some pos­
itive K > 0 such that 
CE(XIkr) � (> )CE(Yikr) for all k � K. 
She is said to find that X (strictly) dominates Y 
in flexibility if she finds that X is (strictly) more flex­
ible than Y with K = 1, that is, 
CE(XIkr) � (> )CE(Yikr) for all k � 1. 
By this definition, if X (strictly) dominates Y in flex­
ibility then X is (strictly) more flexible than Y. 
Consider the graphs shown in Figure 5. In Figure 5a 
and Figure 5b, the uncertain monetary prospect Y 
is strictly more flexible than the uncertain monetary 
prospect X, while in Figure 5d, X is more flexible than 
Y, but not strictly. There is dominance shown in Fig­
ure 5a, where Y strictly dominates X in flexibility, and 
Figure 5d, where X dominates Y in flexibility. There 
is no dominance shown in Figure 5b. It is quite possi­
ble to have curves like those shown in Figure 5c, where 
neither X nor Y is more flexible, and thus neiher can 
dominate. 
Most of the properties of the flexibility compari­
son follow from properties of the certain equivalent, 
CE(XIkr). The certain equivalent is in units of an at­
tribute, which we have assumed is money. As a func­
tion of k, CE(XIkr) is continuous and nondecreasing 
(assuming r > 0). 
If X is deterministic, that is, it takes on a value for 
certain, then CE(XIkr) = CE(XIr) for all k > 0. The 
worst case for X, the smallest possible value of X, is 
approached by CE(XIkr) as k increases. More for­
mally, 
k
lim CE(XIkr) :S: x if Pr{X :S: x} > 0. -->00 
Therefore, if X and Y are two monetary prospects 
between which the decision-maker is indifferent and Y 
is deterministic, then Y dominates X in flexibility. 
We can now return to the desiderata from Section 2 
to see (surprise! surprise!) that they are satisfied by 
the proposed approach. It is conceptually simple and 
can be applied to a wide variety of decision models, 
including decision trees and influence diagrams. In 
fact, it can even be applied to compare the flexibility 
at different nodes in the same decision tree. Since the 
certain equivalent never decreases when an alternative 
is added, it satisfies our intuition in that flexibility 
b) 
c) 
d) 
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Figure 5: Example graphs of certain equivalents as a 
function of k for two uncertain monetary prospects, X 
and Y. The certain equivalent for X is drawn with a 
solid line while the certain equivalent for Y is drawn 
with a dashed line. The graphs illustrate, respectively, 
Y strictly dominating X in flexibility, Y strictly more 
flexible than X, neither more flexible, and X dominat­
ing Y in flexibility. 
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�C:Commit1 
�8: Commit Now L.l..,__ 
A � D: Commit 2 
E: Wait to Commit 
Figure 6: This is a decision analysis type decision tree 
in which every node represents a decision. We can 
choose to commit to either 1 (C) or 2 (D), or choose 
between them now (B) or choose between them later 
(E). The situation where we can decide whether to 
choose now or later is A. 
does not decrease in that case. Of course, it allows 
the decision-maker to test new alternatives easily and 
might help her conceive of them, too. 
What remains to be shown is that this approach is 
general enough to incorporate most of the concepts of 
flexibility in the literature. This follows from the de­
cision analytical nature of the approach. Consider the 
notion of robust flexibility introduced by Stigler(1939) 
and illustrated in Figure 1. As k is increased we would 
expect that the certain equivalent for the situation 
with cost curve C1 will decrease more rapidly than 
the situation with cost curve C2. Thus, we obtain the 
intuitive result that C2 is strictly more flexible than 
C1, although not necessarily dominant. 
Consider the adaptive flexibility case represented by 
the influence diagram shown in Figure 2. For each 
possible decision strategy there is a flexibility curve, 
and we might expect some curves to be more flexible 
than others. Often these will be the most adaptive 
plans, but it is quite possible that a robust plan could 
be the most flexible. Thus we can represent adaptive 
flexibility but we are not restricted to it. 
Another example of flexibility comparison corresponds 
to the sequential decision tree shown in Figure 6. De­
cision B lets us choose between decision C or decision 
D, so the certain equivalent at B is at least as big 
as the certain equivalent at either C or D for all k. 
Therefore, B dominates both C and D in flexibility. 
By the same logic, A dominates B, C, D, and E in 
flexibility. If there is no cost to waiting to commit, 
then E dominates B, C, and D in flexibility. 
The analysis is further simplified if the uncertain mon­
etary prospect X is distributed with a Gaussian dis­
tribution, characterized by its mean, E{ X}, and vari­
ance, Var{X}. In this case, the certain equivalent 
CE(XIkr) is linear ink, 
CE(XIkr) = E{X}-
Var�X} kr. 
Note that the certain equivalent is unbounded as k 
increases unless the prospect is deterministic. That is 
because there is probability mass at arbitrarily low val­
ues, so the worst case certain equivalent is unbounded. 
If, in the Stigler example, the monetary prospects C1 
and C2 have Gaussian distributions, then they might 
be represented by the graphs in either Figure 7a or 
Figure 7b. In both cases, C2 is strictly more flexible 
than C1 and in Figure 7b C2 strictly dominates C1 in 
flexibility. Similarly, if every monetary prospect in the 
adaptive example has a Gaussian distribution, then it 
might be represented by the graph in Figure 7c. If 
one curve has a flatter slope than another then it is 
more flexible. There can be a number of curves that 
are optimal for some k, but some of the curves might 
not be optimal for any k. 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
In this paper, we have proposed a simple decision­
analytic approach to comparing the flexibility of dif­
ferent plans or decision situations. This is particularly 
useful for automated reasoning tasks where we have 
limited resources for model construction and analysis 
(Horvitz 1990). Under such circumstances, we need 
a robust estimate of the uncertainty which has gone 
unmodeled, precisely what our measure of flexibility 
provides. 
Our approach behaves according to our intuitive no­
tions of flexibility as well as the concepts in the lit­
erature, without imposing severe restrictions on the 
types of models. Because the method forces a model 
beyond its design parameters, it can introduce addi­
tional modeling inaccuracy. Therefore, the "stretched" 
model should not be examined too precisely, but rather 
used for the critical creative task of stimulating and 
generating new, more flexible alternatives. 
A natural direction for future research would relax the 
assumption that the decision-maker satisfies the delta 
property. To increase the uncertainty in the value 
attribute distribution as a function of parameter k, 
we could transform the uncertain prospect from X to 
kX + Z where Z is an uncertain prospect which is in­
dependent of X, although it could depend on k. It 
is just not clear to us at this point what would be 
an appropriate value for Z. If a deterministic value 
were chosen for Z, then this approach would be easy 
to perform for general decision problems. 
The proposed framework looks at different plans as we 
increase k from 1. Some further research might inves­
tigate the value of considering values of k less than 
1. There might even be some insights to be gained by 
considering negative values of k, turning the decision­
maker into a risk-seeker. 
In this paper we have assumed that the decision­
maker is risk-averse, but we could imagine modeling 
the behavior of a risk-neutral decision-maker, that is a 
monetary equivalent decision-maker satifying the delta 
property with absolute risk-aversion r = 0. This poses 
a couple of problems for our approach. First, there 
would be no sense in applying the method without any 
modifications, since CE(X\Ok) = CE(XIO). Second, 
a) 
k 
1 
b) 
c) 
Figure 7: W hen the monetary prospects have Gaus­
sian distributions, they are represented by lines in the 
graph. Figure 7a and Figure 7b represent cases of the 
Stigler example while Figure 7c represents an instance 
of the adapative example. 
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in building a model for a risk-neutral decision-maker, 
there is no need to introduce much of the uncertainty, 
since it is not relevant for making the decisions. Thus 
such a model would be quite brittle with respect to 
changes in r. 
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